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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
SUMlVIFr RANGJ~ AND LIVESTOCK ) 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. j 
HAY REES, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
8063 
Respondent, the plaintiff below, is in substantial 
disagreement with certain facts set forth by appellant 
in his statement of facts, and therefore believes it desira-
ble to set forth the following statement of facts: 
Respondent is a corporation organized October 5, 
1900 pursuant to the provisions of Chapter I, Part IV 
of the Compiled Laws of Utah, 1888 (H. 40). The 
original object for which the company was incorporated, 
as contained in the Articles of Incorporation as well as 
the objects set forth in the Amendment (R. 40-49) of 
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April 25, 1925, are quoted on page 2 of Appellant's Brief. 
The Articles of Incorporation also provided that the 
Board of Directors shall have power to n1ake all by-laws 
for the manage1nent of the business and property of the 
company, the regulation of its affairs and the transfer 
of its stock, for prescribing the duty of its officers and 
such other by-laws, rules and regulations as may be 
necessary for fully carrying out the objects of this 
corporation, not inconsistent with law or other corporate 
rights or vested privileges (R. 42). Appellant in his 
statement of facts states (p. 3) that "the purpose of the 
corporation since 1900 has remained that of a general 
business corporation for profit." Hespondent agrees that 
there has been no change in the Articles of Incorporation 
with respect to the object, business and pursuits of the 
corporation since April 25, 1925, but it disagrees with 
the conclusion set out in said statement that the Articles 
created a general business corporation for profit, or that 
the Respondent has ever opera ted as such. 
Respondent's complaint alleged (R. 1), and Appel-
lant in his answer adinitted (R. 7), that the Respondent 
owns and for many years has owned a large tract of 
range land in Summit County, Utah, which has been held 
and is now held by the Respondent for the use and benefit 
of the stockholders. Appellant's brief, on page 3, states 
that the trial court found that as time passed the com-
pany assu1ned a mutual, non-profit character. The 
Respondent disagrees with this state1nent of alleged fact. 
'rhe trial court's findings of fact contain no suggestion 
that the Respondent ever "assun1ed" a different character 
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than it started with and such a finding would have been 
contrary to the evidence. 'l1he trial court found, as 
alleged in the complaint and admitted in the answer, 
that the Respondent had owned the land in Sumrnit 
County for rnany years and that it had been, and now is, 
held by the Respondent for the use and benefit of the 
stockholders of the corporation as range land upon which 
the said stockholders are authorized to place their live-
stock for grazing purposes (R. 18). 
By-laws were adopted by the Board of Directors on 
March 4, 1952 ( R. 18) and a copy thereof submitted to 
the trial court upon a stipulation of the parties (R. 28, 
30-39). Appellant's brief described the by-laws to be "a 
spelling out and an attempted ratification of the then 
current practices of the corporation in allowing its stock-
holders to use, rent free, the grazing lands of the com-
pany." (Br. 3). This conclusion is not a fact as found 
by the court. No evidence or testimony was offered in 
the trial court on the "practices" of the corporation in 
this rega1·d, as the point was never raised in the court 
below. 
Appellant is a stockholder of the Respondent corpo-
ration, owning 9101j2 shares of stock of the authorized 
6000 shares ( R. 28, 41). During the 1952 grazing season 
he was the only stockholder grazing cattle upon the 
company range (R. 28). In placing his cattle upon the 
company range, Appellant did so without regard to the 
said by-laws, whereupon the Respondent filed its com-
plaint in the Third Judicial Court in and for Summit 
County on June 2, 1952, wherein the Respondent set out 
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generally the provisions of certain by-laws and reciting 
that Appellant had wilfully and intentionally placed his 
cattle on the range prior to the authorized date, did not 
advise the Board of Directors of what stock he intended 
to place thereon, that he refused to keep his cattle in 
the areas designated by the Board for the grazing of 
cattle, that he permitted his cattle to graze on the high 
summer range and did irreparable damage to young, 
tender grass thereon, and that he refused to discuss the 
matter with the Board and stated he intended to use the 
range in accordance with his own desires. The com-
plaint asked that he be enjoined from placing and grazing 
his cattle on the range in defiance of the by-laws (R. 1-4). 
Appellant answered alleging, not that the "by-laws 
of the company were unlawful and contrary to the 
objects of the articles of incorporation" as set out in 
Appellant's brief (Br. 4), but only that those provisions 
of the by-laws which stated "that the Board of Directors 
shall annually designate areas of the range to be used 
for the feeding of cattle, horses, or sheep; that such 
cattle, horses or sheep men shall be responsible for keep-
ing their respective types of stock in the areas so desig-
nated by the Board of Directors" were "in this particular 
instance, unfair, unequitable, unlawful, contrary to the 
intents and objects of the Articles of Incorporation, dis-
criminative and prejudicial" to Appellant's substantive 
rights as a stock holder, and that said provisions were 
"confiscatory of this defendant's rights to the beneficial 
use of the range" as a stockholder (R. 7, 8). Appellant 
also alleged in his answer as an affirmative defense that 
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"the purported by-laws were unlawful, etc., and con-
trary to the objects and intents of the articles of incorpo-
ration in the particular that said by-laws fail to equi-
tably and annually assess the expenses of reasonable and 
beneficial use of the range as between the sheep men," 
and the Appellant, a cattle man (R. 9). Appellant also 
filed a counterclaim setting out certain of the by-laws, 
alleging that the Respondent company was "organized 
for the purpose of providing range land for cattle," that 
Appellant had been deprived of his equitable use of the 
range by the adoption of the by-laws and praying for 
certain remedies including one that the court declare 
void the provisions of those by-laws "which tend to 
deprive the Defendant of his fair, equitable and equal 
rights as a minority stockholder" (R. 9-13). An answer 
to the counterclaim was filed (R.14, 15). 
A question was submitted to the court upon a stipu-
lation which provided that the only issue to be tried by 
the court on January 24, 1953, the date on which the 
case was originally set for trial, was whether paragraph 
5 of Article I and paragraphs 8 and 11 of Article V of 
the by-laws, or any part of said paragraphs, were invalid, 
and that all other issues were to be tried or otherwise 
disposed of at a future date (R. 28, 29). The stipulation 
did not provide, as suggested in Appellant's brief (Br. 
5), that the legality of all of the by-laws was to be decided 
by the court. The stipulation also included a copy of the 
articles of incorporation and the amendments thereto 
(R. 40-51) and a copy of the by-laws (R. 30-39). 
The three paragraphs submitted to the trial court 
5 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
for a ruling as to their validity read as follows: 
Paragraph 5, Article I (R. 30, 31) 
"If any stockholder desires to sell his stock 
in the Corporation, or any part thereof, and shall 
receive a bona fide offer for the purchase of his 
stock from any person or . persons who are not 
stockholders in the Corporation, the said stock 
may not be sold or transferred to such person or 
persons without first offering to sell the same to 
the Company or other stockholders at the price 
offered. Such offer for the sale of the stock shall 
be made to the Board of Directors by the stock-
holder desiring to sell, and it shall be the responsi-
bility of the Board of Directors to determine 
whether the Con1pany or any of the other stock-
holders wish to purchase the stock at the price 
offered for it. 
"The Board of Directors shall advise the 
stockholder within thirty days from the date the 
offer is made as to whether or not the Company 
or any other stockholder will buy the stock from 
him. F·ailure to so advise shall constitute a waiver 
of this right to buy on the part of the Compan;' 
and other stockholders. 
"This restriction on the transfer of stock 
shall be valid and binding on all stockholders who 
agree thereto and surrender their certificates to 
the Company for the purpos·e of having this 
restriction stamped on the said certificates as 
required by Section 18-3-15 of the Utah Code 
Annotated, 1943." 
Paragraph 8, Article V (R. 36, 37) 
"The Board of Directors shall annually desig-
nate areas of the range to be used for the feeding 
of cattle or horses. rl,he &."tent or acreage of such 
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area shall be determined on the basis of the nrun-
ber of shares held by the stockholders desiring to 
place cattle or horses thereon, and shall include 
ade4uate water facilities." 
Paragraph 11, Article V ( R. 37) 
"'The cattle and horse men shall he responsi-
ble for keeping their cattle and horses within the 
area designated each year by the Board of Direc-
tors for use for grazing cattle and horses." 
It was Appellant's contention that these three by-
laws were unfair, inequitable, unlawful, contrary to the 
interests and objects of the Articles of Incorporation, 
discriminative. and prejudicial to his rights and interests 
as a stockholder. Respondent denied the same (R. 29). 
The trial court found that the said three paragraphs 
were not unfair, inequitable, unlawful or contrary to 
the interests and objects of the Articles of Incorporation, 
and did not discriminate and are not prejudicial to the 
Appellant's substantive rights and interests as a stock-
holder, and concluded that the same were valid and 
binding on the stockholders of the cmnpany (R. 18, 19). 
Judgn1ent was accordingly entered adjudging the three 
above set out paragraphs to be valid and binding on the 
stockholders ( R. 20, 21). The trial court did not, as 
stated in Appellant's brief (Br. 6), adjudge that all of 
the by-laws were valid, but limited its ruling to the three 
paragraphs of said by-laws submitted to it for determina-
tion by the stipulation (R. 20, 21). 
STATEMENT OF' POINTS 
In reply to Appellant's brief, Respondent wishes to 
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present additional points for the consideration of the 
Court. These points, together with Point III raised by 
Appellant, will be specifically set out and discussed as 
indicated below. It is believed that Appellant's Points 
I and II will be covered in the Argument on the points 
hereinafter set forth. 
POINT I. 
APPELLANT CANNOT ATTACK FOR THE FIRST TIME 
ON THIS APPEAL THE VALIDITY OF ALL OF THE BY-
LAWS OF RESPONDENT CORPORATION AS THAT QUES-
Tl'ON WAS NEVER RAISED IN OR DECIDED BY THE 
TRIAL COURT. 
POINT II. 
APPELLANT CANNOT CHANGE HIS THEORY OF 
DEFENSE UPON WHICH THE ISSUE PRESENTED TO THE 
TRIAL COURT WAS TRIED AND PRESENT A NEW 
THEORY OF DEFENSE FOR THE FIRST TIME IN THE 
APPELLATE COURT. 
POINT III. 
PARAGRAPH 5, ARTICLE I OF THE BY-LAWS IS 
ILLEGAL BY AUTHORIZING THE COMPANY TO PUR-
CHASE ITS OWN STOCK IN CONTRAVENTION OF LAW. 
ARGUMENT 
In the opening paragraph of Appellant's brief (Br. 
1) it is stated that the basic question involved in this 
appeal is whether the ordinary business or trading 
corporation can be changed into a cooperative merely by 
the adoption of by-laws to that effect. With this state-
ment, Respondent does not agree. That no such question 
is involved will, it is believed, clearly appear from the 
following discussion of Respondent's Statement of 
Points. 
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POINT I. 
APPELLANT CANNOT ATTACK FOR THE FIRST TIME 
ON THIS APPEAL THE VALIDITY OF ALL OF THE BY-
LAWS OF RESPONDENT CORPORATION AS THAT QUES-
TION WAS NEVER RAISED IN OR DECIDED BY THE 
TRIAL COURT. 
Appellant's Points I and II are surprising, to say 
the least. In his notice of appeal, Appellant gave notice 
of his appeal from the judgment entered in this action 
on May 29, 1953 (R. 23). By said judgment the trial 
court merely ruled that paragraph 5 of Article I and 
paragraphs 8 and 11 of Article V of the By-Laws adopted 
by the respondent corporation were valid and binding 
upon all of the stockholders of said corporation (R. 20). 
The stipulation entered into between Appellant and 
Respondent expressly limited the issue in the court below 
to the validity of the said three paragraphs (R. 28, 29). 
Appellant, in his Point I, now for the first time in this 
action attacks the validity of all of the By-Laws and 
asks this court to rule that all of said By-Laws are 
invalid and illegal. Not only was that question never 
presented to the court below, but Appellant has never 
at any time suggested that all of the By-Laws were 
invalid or illegal for any reason. 
It is a well settled rule of law, established by num-
erous courts in nurnerous cases, subject to certain limi-
tations not applicable here, that the appellate court will 
consider only such questions as were raised and reserved 
in the court below. (See cases set out in note 15, 3 Am. 
J ur., pp. 25-31.) 
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''The rule is based upon considerations of 
practical necessity in the orderly adn1inistration 
of law and of fairness to the court and the opposite 
party, and upon the principles underlying the 
doctrines of waiver and estoppel. Obviously, the 
ends of justice are served by the avoidance of the 
delay and expense incident to appeals, reversals 
and new trials upon grounds of objection which 
might have been obviated or corrected in the trial 
court if the question had been raised." (3 Am. 
J ur. Sec. 246, p. 25-28) 
The Supreme Court of Utah has followed the rule in 
many cases. In Idaho State Bank v. Hooper Sugar Com-
pany, 74 Utah 24,276 P. 659, this court stated: 
"The contention is made on behalf of defend-
ant Wright, however, that the complaint does not 
allege that plain tiff is a holder in due course of 
the note sued upon, and therefore no issue is 
raised as to whether or not plaintiff is or is not 
a bona fide holder for value of such note. The 
complaint does allege 'that the plaintiff is now 
the owner and holder of said note,' meaning the 
note indorsed by vVright and upon which this 
action is founded. No question was raised in the 
trial court that the complaint is uncertain or 
ambiguous in not alleging the kind of holder plain-
tiff claimed to be. Such question is raised for the 
first time in the brief filed on behalf of Wright. 
In the absence of a timely attack up,on the com-
plaint in such respect, "\Vright should not be heard 
to complain about any ambiguity or uncertainty 
of the complaint for the first time in this court." 
(P. 677) 
In Sandall v. Sandall, 57 Utah 150, 193 P. 1093, this court 
said: 
10 
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"Many errors are assigned; ... others raise 
questions not presented in the court below; ... 
"Such ornissions and com1nissions on the part 
of appellant are in disregard of the rules of 
practice of this court and have been conde1nned 
1>y the decisions of the court in every case with 
which we are familiar wherein the objection has 
been reasonably n1ade and relied upon." 
In Summit County v. Gustaveson, 18 Utah 351, 54 P. 977, 
this court said : 
''Counsel in the case have discussed the ques-
tion of the constitutionality of the statute and the 
ordinance created under it, but inasn1uch as that 
<-luestion was not presented to or passed upon by 
the trial court, we refrain from any discussion of 
that question at this tirne. The questions we have 
discussed are the only questions passed upon by 
the trial court." 
In North Salt Lake v. St. Joseph Water & Irrigation Co., 
223 P. 2d 577, this court, in holding that it was unable 
to pass on the contention that a motion to dismiss should 
not have been granted for the reason that appellant Gibbs 
was entitled to darnages for the use of the pipe line 
extension during a period of temporary occupancy, 
stated: 
"'-rhe reason that we are precluded from con-
sidering the 4uestion is that the issues were not 
framed in the court below. We cannot pass on 
rnatters raised for the first tinte in this court." 
Respondent believes that the case of Fee v. First 
National Bank of the Republic, 37 Utah 28, 106 P. 517, 
decided by this court, is closely in point. There, as in 
the case at bar, counsel limited the question to be decided 
11 
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by the trial court. In that case the question was limited 
to determining whether appellant had in fact paid the 
surn in controversy to the respondent or his order. The 
court, in its opinion, stated: 
"It seems that at the trial the question of 
whether such payment was made was thought to 
depend entirely on whether the check for $1,075 
was genuine or not. This at least was the theory 
of counsel who represented appellant at the trial, 
as clearly appears from his own statement, which 
is incorporated into and made a part of the bill 
of exceptions. Counsel there said that, if the 
court found for the appellant 'on the question of 
the genuiness of the signature of Dennis Fee, ... 
judgment should be entered in favor of plaintjff 
in the sum of $2.62, with interest and costs of 
suit.' Counsel for appellant thus, in effect, told 
the court that, if the court found that the check 
for $1,075 was genuine, then appellant was 
entitled to a credit for the gross amount deposited 
which it had admitted it had received from 
respondent, and under such finding respondent 
would be still entitled to a judgment for $2.62, the 
balance rernaining on deposit with appellant. 
Counsel thus asked the court to make appellant's 
liability depend upon the genuineness of the sig-
nature to the check, and upon nothing else. The 
court thus elem.inated all other questions ... " 
(Emphasis ours). 
Appellant in its brief, in the Fee case, argued that 
there was evidence tending to show that respondent 
authorized the drawing and issuance of the check to 
which respondent's name was signed without his author-
ity. Appellant also pointed out that ~here was some evi-
dence tending to show that respondent was guilty of a 
12 
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'~, .. , 
lack of diligence in failing to notify appellant not to 
honor or pay the check. The court said: 
''Appellant now urges that we pass upon 
those questions and insists that the findings and 
judg1nent ought to have been in favor of appel-
lanr,, 111 view of the state of the evidence upon 
those questions. These matters were, however, not 
sulnn,itted to the trial court. As we have seen, the 
pleadings presented but one issue and that was 
whether appellant had on respondent's dernand 
paid hun the SUlll of $1,075. . . If we should 
assmne, therefore, that under the issues presented 
by the pleadings the court should have passed 
upon two propositions ( 1) whether the check was 
genuine- that is, whether it was signed by 
respondent-and (2) if not signed by hi1n, whether 
he nevertheless permitted the same to be issued, 
presented for payment, and paid, when he could 
have prevented such a result, yet in view of the 
only qtttestion which counsel for appellant asked 
the tr,ial court to pass on, and which it did, we are 
not authorized to pass upon the second proposi-
tion stated above, for the reason that the trial 
co1.,~rt did not pass ttpon it and was not asked to do 
so, but the court was asked to and did Inake the 
liability of appellant depend upon the genuineness 
of the signature to the check. . . If counsel had no 
confidence in the evidence adduced in support of 
the second proposition, why should the court have 
considered it? r:ehe findings respond to the issues 
as presented by the pleadings, and, in view of 
counsel's state1nent to the court, they also covered 
all questions raised by the evidence. This is all 
appellant can insist upon, and this is especially so 
in view of the fact that appellant did not request 
any findings upon the collateral questions which 
it now urges should be passed upon. (As in the 
13 
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case at bar.) The most that can be said with 
regard to the appellant's contentions relative to 
the findings is that appellant has changed counsel 
(as in the case at bar) and that it has also changed 
the theory upon which the case was presented to 
the trial court." (Emphasis added) 
It is, therefore, Respondent's contention that Appel-
lant cannot raise in this court any question relating to the 
validity of the By-Laws adopted by the Respondent 
corporation, because no such question was ever submitted 
for consideration of the court below, and consideration of 
the court below was limited to the validity of the three 
By-Laws. 
POINT II. 
APPELLANT CANNOT CHANGE HIS THEORY OF 
DEFENSE UPON WHICH THE ISSUE PRESENTED TO THE 
TRIAL COURT WAS TRIED AND PRESENT A NEW 
THEORY OF DEFENSE FOR THE FIRST TIME IN THE 
APPELLATE COURT. 
The Appellant, in Points I and II of his Statement 
of Points, has changed the theory and defense· upon 
which the issue was presented to the trial court. In the 
court below it was Appellant's contention that the afore-
mentioned three paragraphs in the By-Laws, the validity 
of which was submitted to the court below as the only 
issue, were invalid because they deprived him of the 
beneficial use of the Respondent's range for grazing his 
individually owned livestock thereon and preyented him 
from using it in accordance with his own wishes. Appel-
lant, in his brief, for the first time now contends that all 
of the By-Laws, including the two specifically passed 
14 
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upon by the trial court and set out in his Point II, are 
invalid and illegal for the reason that they change the 
purpose and character of the company from that of a 
general business corporation to a non-profit cooperative 
association. No such theory was ever suggested to the 
trial court. IIad Appellant raised that theory or defense 
in the court below, evidence and testimony could have 
been taken from which the trial court could have decided 
that contention. Appellant, in his brief, assumes that the 
Respondent corporation started as a general business 
corporation and changed to a cooperative upon the adop-
tion of its By-Laws on March 4, 195'2. Not only is such 
assumption erroneous, but Appellant himself knows that 
the use to which the range has been put has never 
changed over the years ( R. 58). 
In the stipulation it was specifically stated that it 
was Appellant's contention that the aforementioned three 
paragraphs of the By-Laws were "unfair, inequitable, 
unlawful, contrary to the interests and objects of the 
Articles of Incorporation, discriminative and prejudicial 
to the defendant's (Appellant's) substantive rights and 
interests as a stockholder." (R. 29). The stipulation did 
not state in what particulars the said three paragraphs 
met these contentions and the question may well be asked, 
"What was Appellant's theory or defense in the court 
below~" 
"In order to determine the theory of a case 
as presented to the trial court, the appellate court 
will look to the entire record and the briefs of 
counsel and will construe the pleadings on the 
theory most apparent, most clearly outlined by 
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the facts stated and according to their general 
scope and tenor." (3 Am. Jur. :Sec. 253 p. 38) 
An examination of the record will di~close that 
Appellant in the court below never suggested at that tin1e 
or in any of his pleadings that the By-Laws or any of 
them were invalid because they changed the nature of 
the business from that of a business corporation for 
profit to a non-profit cooperative association. His con-
tention that certain of the By-Laws were contrary to the 
interests and objects of the corporation was never based 
in the court below upon the theory he now attempts to 
assert on appeal. On the contrary, in the court below 
Appellant went to the opposite extreme and based his 
attack upon certain of the By-Laws upon the ground that 
as a stockholder in Respondent corporation he had the 
unqualified right to place his cattle upon the company 
range without restrictio.n &."(Cept as to the number of 
cattle to be so placed, that the By-Laws as adopted inter-
fered with that right, and that he had that right as a 
stockholder by virtue of the fact that the company was 
originally organized for the purpose of providing range 
land for the stockholders' cattle. Appellant knows that 
the company never operated fo.r profit and that the By-
Laws made no change in the operations of the Respond-
ent with respect to the purpose for which the range was 
owned and held by the Respondent. 
An exan1ination of the record will support Respond-
ent's foregoing staten1ent of Appellant's theory in the 
trial court. In his answer to the complaint, Appellant, in 
discussing paragraphs 8 and 11 of Article V of the By-
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Laws, makes the same contentions with respect thereto 
as those set out in the stipulation and heretofore in this 
brief, and asserts that said By-Laws were "confiscatory 
of this Defendant's right to the beneficial use of the 
range pursuant to his share of stock in the plaintiff 
corporation for the Board of Directors to require him to 
keep his cattle in the areas designated by the Board of 
Directors," ( en1phasis ours) and further, that because he 
is the only stockholder "running cattle on the range," the 
others being sheep men, the said two By-Laws deprive 
him "of his equitable beneficial use of the range." (R. 
7, 8). 
Further light is thrown upon the question of what 
Appellant's theory was in the trial court in his Third 
Defense to the complaint set out in his answer, wherein 
Appellant asserts that the purported By-Laws referred 
to in the complaint "are unlawful, inequitable and preju-
dicial to the substantive rights of the defendant as a 
minority stockholder in the plaintiff corporation and are 
contrary to the intents and objects of the Articles of 
Incorporation of the plaintiff corporation in the particu-
lar that said By-Laws fail to equitably and annually 
assess the expenses of reasonable and beneficial use of 
the range as between the sheep men and this defendant, 
who is a cattle man." (Emphasis ours) (R. 9) In this 
Third Defense, Appellant also alleges that he has offered 
"to accept a division of the range land proportionate to 
his share in said plaintiff corporation," and that the 
Board of Directors has refused to cooperate with him in · 
"working out a fair and impartial solution to the prob-
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lems incidential to running sheep and cattle on the same 
range." (R. 9) 
The theory of Appellant's defense is also revealed 
in his Counterclaim, wherein, after setting out c-ertain 
by-laws, including the three which were subn1itted to the 
court for a ruling thereon, Appellant alleges that origin-
ally the Respondent company was organized for the pur-
pose of "providing range land for cattle," but that since 
then substantially all of the stockholders except Appel-
lant have become sheep men. It is further alleged that in 
passing and enforcing said by-laws the company had 
made "it utterly impracticable, unfeasible, and economi-
cally impossible for defendant to keep his livestock in 
the area or areas designated," and that the Respondent 
has failed and refused to "take cognizance of this defend-
ant's rights to fair and equitable use of the range as a 
shareholder." (R. 11) 
Appellant's prayer for relief in the Counterclaim 
prays that the court restrain the Appellant from adminis-
tering the affairs of the company which in any manner 
deprives the Appellant "of any equal and equitable bene-
f'icial use of the range." He further asked the court to 
either (1) divide and partition the company's range land 
and to set aside his proportionate share as his "own land 
in fee simple," (2) appoint an impartial referee to make 
an inspection and recon1mendation to the court for the 
designation of a permanent area or alternating areas of 
the range to be used as cattle range so that said area or 
areas might be fenced at the Respondent's expense, or 
(3) that necessary herders be hired at corporation ex-
pense ( R. 12, 13). 
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Appellant's counsel in the court below submitted a 
memorandum brief and a reply which clearly demon-
strate his theory and defense. On page 3 of his memo-
randtun brief appears the following: 
"Surely our opponents will concede that the 
prin1ary purpose and object of the plaintiff 
organization was to enable its members to receive 
equal beneficial use of the range in proportion to 
the respective shares held by each member. This 
has been the primary objectives of this company 
for over forty years ... " ( einphasis ours) ( R. 58) 
And on page 4 of his memorandum: 
"'J.1he real sting in the by-laws, and which has 
precipitated this law suit, is found in Article V, 
paragraph 11, which deprives the defendant, not 
only of a fair and equal beneficial use of the 
range, but would force him out of the corporation, 
and incidentally, deprive hi1n of his present means 
of livelihood. Such effect was never the intent and 
purpose of the corporation when organized exclu-
sively as a cattle range, or when the articles were 
amended to permit both cattle and sheep on the 
range .. . 
" ... said by-laws are in the particular 
·referred to unfair, unequitable, unlawful, contrary 
to the intents and objectives of the Articles of 
Incorporation, discrin1inative and prejudicial to 
the sustantive and contractual rights and inter-
ests of the defendant ... " (emphasis ours) ( R. 
59) 
Appellant's reply memorandum brief filed in the 
court below contains similar allegations (R. 70-72). 
Thus, it can be seen that Appellant in the court below 
never took the position, as he now does, that the three 
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by-laws in question, or all of then1 for that matter, were 
. unlawful, discriminative, prejudicial to his rights or con-
trary to the interests and objects of the Articles of 
Incorporation because they change the c01npany from a 
general business corporation to that of a cooperative. 
His theory and defense was entirely based upon the claim 
that the by-laws prevented him from using the company 
range as he saw fit and as he had always done in the past 
in placing his own cattle upon it. 
It is well settled that the theory upon which the 
case was tried in the court below rnust be strictly adhered 
to on appeal. This rule has been followed by this court 
1n many cases. 
In Holman v. Christensen, 73 Utah 389, 274 P. 457, 
this court said: 
"The pleadings and the trial proceeded upon 
the theory that the spring water involved in this 
controversy was originally public water, and M 
such, subject to appropriation. The cause having 
been tried on such theory, \Ye are not at liberty to 
dispose of it upon s01ne other theory." 
Smith v. Sinaloa LGJnd & Fruit Co., 42 Utah 445, 132 
P. 556, was a case in which plaintiff contended in his 
complaint that the assessment against his stock was void 
for certain stated reasons. For the first time on appeal 
he alleged as a reason that the assessment was void that 
the statute prevented assessments against fully paid 
stock unless axpressly authorized in the articles of incor-
poration and that since the articles were not in evidence, 
there was nothing to show it was permissible. This court 
pointed out that "neither by the pleadings nor evidence 
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was it claimed or shown that the assessment was not 
authorized by the articles of incorporation." This court 
then said: 
"No such point was rnade in the court below. 
It is pressed on u~ here for the first tirne without 
issue or evidence . . . In this the plaintiff does 
violence to the farniliar rules that judicial in-. 
quiries must be confined to the issues, and that 
one rna.y not present and try a cause on one theory 
in the court below and be heard on another in the 
court above." 
In Chipman v. American Fork City, 54 Utah 93, 179 
P. 742, the court held that the defense that the damage 
complained of was the result of an act of God was not 
available on appeal because not raised in the court below. 
This rule was again stated by this court in Aaron v. 
Holmes, 35 Utah 49, 99 P. 450, as follows: 
" ... It is also a well-settled rule that a 
theory, assumed and acted upon by the parties 
litigant in the trial court, must be adhered to upon 
appeal. Lebcher v. Lambert, 23 Utah 1, 63, Pac. 
628; Elliott on App. Pro. § 490. In 2 Cyc. 670, it 
is said: 'One of the rnost important results of the 
rule that questions which are not raised in the 
court below c-annot be reviewed in the appellate 
court is that a party cannot, when a cause is 
brought up for appellate review, assume an atti-
tude inconsistent with that taken by him at the 
trial, but that such party is restricted to the 
theory on which the cause was prosecuted or de-
fended in the court below. Thus, where both 
parties act upon a particular theory of the cause 
of action, they will not be permitted to depart 
therefrom when the case is brought up for appel-
late review.' Numerous cases are cited in the 
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footnote, which illustrate and support the doc-
trine. As we have pointed out, respondent con-
ceded in the lower court that appellant's default 
occurred through 'inadvertence and excusable 
neglect,' and the questions involved were sub-
mitted to the court upon that theory. Therefore 
under all the authorities he is precluded from 
taking any other or different position in this 
court." 
In Obradovich v. Walker Bros. Ba.nkers, 80 Utah 
587, 16 P. 2d 212, this court held that where, in the trial 
court, the objection was made that the testimony offered 
by a witness was irrelevant and immaterial and self-
serving, and, for the first time on appeal, appellant con-
tended that the witness offering such testimony was not 
a competent witness in the proceeding because of a statu-
tory prohibition, it would not consider that objection 
because that theory had not been presented in the court 
below. 
In Neilson v. Eisen, 116 Utah 343, 209 P. 2d 928, in 
which case the only contention appellant Eisen made in 
the trial court was that his daughter was not acting as 
his agent when she entered into a contract of purchase 
of a home, this court said: 
"However, upon this appeal that contention 
has been abandoned by Mr. Eisen. He now con-
tends for the first tirne that (1) (three other 
separate contentions set out)." 
"It is not necessary for us to examine on their 
merits the three contentions raised by 1\fr. Eisen 
on this appeal. They are all matters of defense 
which should have been raised below and cannot 
now be· heard here for the first time." 
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Appellant's entire argument in his brief is based 
upon his assertion that the Articles of Incorporation 
created a general business corporation for profit and 
that the by-laws changed that purpose to a non-profit 
cooperative. I-Iad he raised it in the trial court, Respond-
ent would have had an opportunity to show otherwise and 
the trial court would have had the benefit of evidence 
and testlinony in passing upon such argument. The 
principles of law laid down by the courts in the rases 
cited by . :\.ppellant may well be correct, but it is neither 
fair to the trial court nor to Respondent to raise the 
defense or theory asserted in his Points I and II here 
for the first tin1e on appeal. 
Respondent wishes to point out, however, that there 
is no basis for the defense now raised by Appellant in 
this appeal. As stated before, the Respondent company 
was incorporated in 1900 under the Compiled Laws of 
Utah, 1888. Section 2267 permitted the formation of all 
types of corporations, as for example, "benevolent, chari-
table or scientific associations, or for any rightful sub-
ject . .. " The Articles of Incorporation gave to Respond-
ent the power "to buy, hold, own, occupy and sell real 
estate." (R. 4.0) It has bought and sold real estate, and 
it now holds, owns and occupies real estate, and has ever 
since its incorporation. Respondent was also given the 
power to assess the stock "to meet all incidental expenses 
of the company." (R. 43) If it were organized as a profit-
making company, it would hardly need provide for 
assessments to meet the "incidental expenses .of the com-
pany." It is true that the emnpany does not exercise all 
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its powers, and never has, but, as is generally the case, 
the powers given under the articles were broad and 
generally stated, and it is fundamental that a corpora-
tion need not &.'Xiercise all of its powers granted under 
the articles. At the risk of being repetitious, let us say 
that no clearer statement of the purposes for which the 
company was organized can be given than that made by 
Appellant's counsel in the court below when he said that 
"the primary purpose and object of the plaintiff organi-
zation was to enable its members to receive equal bene-
ficial use of the range in proportion to the respective 
shares held by each member. This has been the primary 
objective of this compawy for over forty years . .. " (R. 
58) The company has never operated as a general busi-
ness corporation for profit and was not organized as 
such. Since Appellant has changed his theory as herein 
pointed out, Respondent deems it unnecessary to pursue 
this n1atter further, but did desire to point out to the 
court that there Is, even so, no 1nerit to Appellant's 
contentions. 
POINT III. 
PARAGRAPH 5,_ ARTICLE I OF THE BY-LAWS IS 
ILLEGAL BY AUTHORIZING THE COMPANY TO PUR-
CHASE ITS OWN STOCK IN CONTRAVENTION OF LAW. 
Appellant contends that this provision of the by-laws 
is illegal because Section 76-13-4(2), Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953 (formerly Section 103-12-4), as that section is 
interpreted by this court in Pace v. Pace Bros. Co., 91 
Utah 132, 59· P. 2d 1, prohibits a corporation from pur-
chasing its own stock. 
24 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In Pace v. Pace Bros., the facts involved a suit by a 
distributee on promissory notes given by the corpora-
tion to the distributee's father in exchange for the lat-
ter's stock in the corporation. A mortgage on the corpo-
rate property was given to secure the notes and the suit 
was one of foreclosure. The Supren1e Court took the 
position that Section 103-12-4, R. S. 1933, prohibited a 
corporation from purchasing its own stock under the 
circmnstances that existed in the Pace case. In so doing, 
the court said : 
"We consider the question as to whether the 
defendant corporation, under the circumstances in 
which this purchase was made, had authority to 
buy its own stock held by Sidney Pace. Our deci-
si.on on that question will be li1nited strictly on the 
facts of this case." (En1phasis added) 
The court also made the observation that, "In the 
instant case the purchase of Sidney Pace's stock does 
appear not to have been done for the protection of the 
co1npany, but for the benefit and accomodation of Pace," 
and in its decision stated: 
"\Ve believe that 103-12-4, subd. 2., was de-
signed to prevent the purchase by a corporation 
of its own stock even though at the time of the 
purchase it was not insolvent nor would be by 
suc-h purchase rendered insolvent, at least in cases 
where it was not for the protection of the corpo-
ration or for its legitimate corporate purposes." 
(Emphasis ours.) 
The court also points out in the Pace case that there 
was no evidence that the property covered by the mort-
gage was not part of the "capital" of the company rather 
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than being included as "surplus" on the books of the com-
pany. 
Thus it seems to Respondent that the Pace decision 
n1ust be limited to the facts of that particular case and 
cannot be taken to mean that any repurchase of its stock 
by a co-rporation, regardless of the circumstances, is void 
under the law. 
In the instant case the attack is n1erely upon the 
legality of a by-law that provides that in the future a 
stockholder desiring to sell his stock must first offer to 
sell the san1e "to the Company or other stockholders at 
the price offered." If such a time came, the circumstances 
may be such that even under the doctrine of the Pace 
case, the purchase by the company, if undertaken, might 
be justified by ( 1) the need of the company to protect 
itself, as, for example, from selling the stock to one who 
had an inferior or diseased group of cattle or sheep to 
place on the range, or ( 2) by the fact that the purchase 
could be made by some means other than through use 
of the "capital" of the company. 
But aside from all this, Respondent believes there is 
a n1ore important reason to support the legality of this 
by-law. 
At the time the Pace case was decided, subsection (~) 
of 103-12-4, R. S. 1933, read as follows: 
"'To divide, withdraw or in any manner, 
except as provided by law, pay to the stockholders, 
or any of the1n, any part of the capital of the 
corporation;" 
Ilowever, in 1943, this section was amended to 
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exempt from its prov1s1ons the redemption and retire-
ment of preferred stock on the condition and in the man-
ner provided by the articles or the preferred stock certif-
icate. And in 1951, a new section, approved March 1, 
1951, prior to the adoption of the by-laws by Respondent, 
was added to the law of corporation (Laws of 1951, Chap. 
23, Sec. 2). This section, now 16-2-16, Utah Code Anno~ 
tated 1953, reads in part as follows: 
'' .. A. corporation may purchase or redeem one 
or 1nore shares of any and all classes of its own 
capital stock in any of the following cases: 
·• (f) In any case where the use of the funds 
or property of a corporation for such purchase or 
rede1nption would not cause the irupairment of 
that portion of its assets acquired as considera-
tion for its shares or that portion which has been 
treated as payment for shares allotted as stock 
dividends." 
Appellant ignores subsection (f) and states only that 
"no provision is made in Section 16-2-16 for a general 
purchase by the corporation of its own stock which would 
change in any way the restriction of Section 76-13-4 
(formerly 103-12-4) or the strict interpretation placed 
upon that latter section by the Pace case." The Pace case 
itself interpreted the clause "except as provided by law," 
as usd in 103-12-4(2) and now included in 76-13-4(2), to 
mean statutory law and not general law as it e...-xists in 
the states and enunciated by the courts. 
Section 16-2-16(£) does away with the restriction of 
76-13-4, Utah Code Annotated 1953 (formerly 103-12-4) 
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except in those cases where the purchase of its own 
stock would "cause the impairment of that portion of its 
assets acquired as consideration for its shares," and 
there is no basis whatsoever for Appellant's position 
that this by-law is illegal, in the absence of any showing 
that the by-law itself would require the purchase of its 
own stock in a nmnner that would impair that portion of 
its assets acquired as consideration for its shares. 
Appellant makes no mention of that portion of para-
graph 5, Article I which restricts the sale of his stock by 
a stockholder without first offering it to other stock-
holders. Even if it could he held that that part of the 
by-law directing that stock be offered first to the com-
pany is illegal (which we don't concede in any sense of 
the word), it remains that that part of the by-law requir-
ing an offer "to other stockholders" is valid. 
"Where a bylaw is entire, each part having a 
general influence over the rest, if one part is void, 
the whole is void; but where a by-law consists of 
several distinct and independent parts, though one 
or more of them is void, the rest are valid. This 
rule is applicable to the different clauses of the 
same by-law; for where it consists of several par-
ticulars, it is, to all intents and purposes, several 
by-laws, though the provisions are thrown to-
gether under the forn1 of one." (13 Am. Jur. 287, 
Sec. 156) 
The right to impose restrictions upon the transfer 
of stock by means of by-laws is recognized under the 
Uniform Stock Transfer Act and Section 16-3-15 of Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, where the restriction is stamped 
upon the stock certificate. 
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According to the weight of authority, a corporate 
by-law prohibiting the sale or transfer of its stock to an 
outsider without first giving the other stockholders an 
opportunity to purchase the same is valid and binding on 
the stockholders. ( G5 A. L. R. 1168) 
The by-law in question expressly provides it shall 
not be binding on any stockholder unless he surrenders 
his certificate for the purpose of having the restriction 
stamped on it (R. 31). Consequently, Appellant is not 
bound by it unless he voluntarily consents to having such 
restriction stamped on his certificate. Once he does so, 
he is bound by his consent, because the by-laws are part 
of the contract that exists between the stockholders. 
Appellant has not done so. While Respondent questions 
Appellant's right to attack the validity of a by-law by 
which he is not hound, in view of what has already been 
said Appellant believes there is no need to pursue the 
matter further. 
In summary, it is incredible that Appellant ·should 
claim in the trial court that he will be denied, by these 
three by-laws, the beneficial use of the range as a stock-
holder, which use, he rightfully states, its stockholders 
have had for "over forty years," and for which purpose, 
he states, the company was organized, and then come 
before this court, reverse hirnself, and for the first time 
suggest that all of the by-laws are invalid, and in effect, 
state that for fifty-three years the company has operated 
illegally by permitting its stockholders to use the com-
pany range. 
As was stated in the Fee case (supra), "the most 
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that can be said with regard to Appellant's contentions 
... is that Appellant has changed counsel." 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the District Court in adjudging 
paragraph 5 of Article I and paragraphs 8 and 11 of 
Article V to be valid and binding on the stockholders 
should be affirmed for the reasons stated. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHN S. BOYDEN, 
BRYANT H. CROFT, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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